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This article is a commentary on a symposium of articles “Beyond the Therapeutic State” in the 
European Journal of Psychotherapy and Counselling, which appeared with it as a published 
response, in EJPC, Vol. 17  No 4, (2015)  pp 418-428.  
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The aim of this symposium of articles (“Beyond the Therapeutic State”) is to develop 
a critique of the dominant psychiatric paradigm for what the symposium  defines as 
mental illness, and to outline alternative psychotherapeutic approaches to mental 
suffering.  It is a coherent and persuasive advocacy of a position of ‘critical 
psychotherapy’.  This article reviews its main arguments, and in its second part 
offers some partially divergent reflections on how issues of mental health discussed 
in the symposium should be responded to.   
The outstanding paper in my view is “Children’s mental health:  Time to stop using 
psychiatric diagnosis,” by Sami Timimi.   This develops a  well-sourced critical 
analysis  of the ‘medical model’ of illness and treatment as this is applied, in what it 
calls hegemonic psychiatric practice  to mental health, in particular to that of children, 
although most of its arguments apply to adult  services as well. Its thesis can be 
stated in the following way.  In the field of physical illness and treatment, there is no 
doubt that the ‘medical model’ has been and indeed remains a successful one.  Its 
science is based on fundamental discoveries about the body and its processes, and 
continues to advance in its scope.  We can add to the author’s summary that it is 
often able to connect symptoms (pains, losses of function, weakness) to their 
causes, in identifiable diseases or organic malfunctions, sometimes with definite 
causal agents – bacterial or viral infections, fractures, tumours, immune deficiencies, 
etc. It has developed batteries of ‘technologies’ – medical interventions – which have 
been able to respond to both symptoms and their causes.  Entire diseases (e.g. 
smallpox, polio) have been eradicated through immunization, or if they haven’t yet 
been it is only because their known remedies have not yet been comprehensively 
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applied.  The course of many illnesses can be fairly accurately anticipated, once 
diagnoses have been made, with predictable success rates for specified treatments.    
There are of course many criticisms that can be made of this ‘medical model’ even 
as it has been applied to physical health.  Medicine is sometimes omnipotently 
attached to the idea of cure, at the expense of sparing patients avoidable suffering.  
There is often insufficient regard paid to psycho-social and relational issues bearing 
on illness and recovery.  There are many distortions in expenditure priorities, for 
example where investment in research on diseases and their remedies does and 
does not take place. Environmental and social causes play a large part in the 
differential incidence of illness -   life expectancy differs between social classes in the 
UK by as much as 10 years.  But for all the qualifications one can make, the author 
of this paper is clear that physical medicine, essentially, works.  
Quite the opposite is the case, he argues, for the sphere of psychiatry and mental 
illness.  In this field, there is no level of explanation for most ‘illnesses’ at a more 
profound level than that of their symptoms.  The diagnostic categories used in 
psychiatry are essentially descriptors, supported by no basic scientific discoveries 
about the nature or causes of mental illness. “Unlike the rest of medicine,’ he writes, 
‘which has developed diagnostic systems that build on an aetiological and 
pathophysiological framework, psychiatric diagnostic manuals such as DSM 5  and 
ICD-10  have failed to connect diagnostic categories with aetiological processes. 
Thus, there are no physical tests referred to in either manual that can be used to 
help establish a diagnosis.”  The diagnostic categories systemized in the two major 
diagnostic manuals are little more than changing catalogues of symptoms, to which 
are often attached pharmacological interventions whose only  claim to effectiveness 
is in symptom reduction. “None of our medications treat a biological abnormality and 
none have been shown to improve long-term outcomes.” 
In physical medicine, the discovery of remedies has often led to the reduction in the 
incidence and severity of illnesses. But in psychiatry, especially child psychiatry 
which is this paper’s main subject, the writer points out that the reverse has in fact 
been the case. The coincident rise in classified illnesses and medications deemed to 
treat them suggests both that the availability (and marketability) of the medications 
has been driving the diagnostic system, and also that the persistence of some 
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conditions (such as depression) may for many sufferers be the outcome of long-term 
dependence on medications.  In a telling analysis, the writer points out that some of 
the NICE recommendations for pharmacological treatments are virtually unsupported 
by the evidence which NICE cites to justify them. 
Like most other papers in this collection, this paper holds that mental illnesses are 
constructed by means of social and cultural definition.  It suggests that there is a 
‘colonial’ model at work, in which western definitions of mental illness are being 
propagated across the world in part in order to increase the marketing opportunities 
for the pharmaceutical industry.   
The author Sami Timimi has set out a compelling critique, which deserves to be 
widely read among mental health practitioners.  If he is right, the reality is that mental 
health requires a quite different forms of understanding, and therefore also quite 
different forms of preventative and remedial intervention, than physical illness.  It is 
to be noted that the author is not anti-rationalist, anti-scientific or anti-technological in 
general principle, as some contributors to this symposium appear implicitly to be. His 
interest is in showing where such forms of scientism are actually applicable, and 
where by contrast they have (so far) failed. 
Other papers in the collection complement Timimi’s critique.  ‘The Triumph of 
American Psychiatry: How It Created the Modern Therapeutic State’ by Robert 
Whitaker describes the development of the psychiatric hospital and psychiatry 
profession. It chooses as its starting point the earlier humane origin of the asylum in 
the Quaker institution of the ‘retreat’ first set up in 1796, in which people with mental 
difficulties could be given seclusion, time and sympathetic care in which they could 
recover. This model was later, however, appropriated and radically transformed by 
the emerging medical sub-profession of psychiatry, with the invention of the custodial 
mental hospital, as a major institution of the therapeutic state.  In the later 19th and 
early 20th centuries, eugenics had a role in this take-over, with its idea that mental 
illness had a genetic basis, and could contaminate society unless its sufferers were 
segregated. In the mid-twentieth century growing public hostility to incarceration and 
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harsh treatment in mental hospitals 1 gave opportunity to psychoanalysts to gain 
influence for ‘the couch’ as a preferred therapy, at one point giving them a degree of 
hegemony in American psychiatry. But then the psychoanalysts (never very 
influential in British psychiatry) were displaced by another version of ‘care in the 
community’, with the emergence of new psychotropic medications as the supposed 
cure for mental illnesses. Drugs were marketed vigorously, for example as remedies 
which it was claimed would work “as well as insulin did for diabetes.”  The outcome 
has been a situation in which there has been a proliferation of psychiatric diagnoses, 
few with scientific merit, and of dependence on medication, with 20% of Americans 
taking drugs on a daily basis.  The author proposes a return to the ‘moral therapy’ of 
the Quakers, though without consideration of how far its effectiveness wmight have 
depend on an earlier  context of shared Quaker beliefs and practices. 
John Shotter, in his chapter, “Psychiatric diagnoses, ‘thought styles’, and ex post 
facto fact fallacies” provides a critique of the philosophical assumptions which he 
holds underpins modern beliefs about mental illness and its treatments.  The 
argument is based on a critique of the rationalistic Cartesian assumptions of 
psychological science.  It hold that linear causal reasoning, and the idea that the 
mind consists of nameable entities capable of being identified and manipulated, as it 
were ‘from outside’, is false. “Living in two-way, dialogical relations with our 
surroundings, rather then in monological, one-way causal relations with them,”, the 
writer states,  “means that we can no longer treat ourselves as inquiring simply into a 
world of ‘things’ already existing in the world around us. We need to see ourselves 
instead as always acting ‘from within’ a still-in-process world of flowing streams of 
intermingling activities affecting us as much, if not more, than we can affect them. In 
such a world as this, instead of discovering pre-existing things in our inquiries, we 
continually bring such ‘things’ into existence.”  What this practically amounts to is the 
need to create a context of dialogue with persons suffering from mental distress, in 
which they can find meaning in their experience, and develop more tenable ways of 
being with themselves and others. Examples are given of individuals who have 
indeed been helped by such experiences, which are persuasive as such particular 
                                            
1 The ‘decarceration’ movement led by Basaglia and other radicals in Italy was exemplary. (Foot 
2015). In the United States, Erving Goffman‘s writing was influential in this development, and in 
Britain in the 1960s, R.D. Laing’s.  
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instances can often be. 
The two subsequent chapters in the collection,  “Stories from the extended therapy 
room’, and "From victimhood to sisterhood-  A practice based reflexive inquiry in to 
narrative informed group work with women who have experienced sexual abuse”   
each  provide examples of  how therapies can be conducted which are in sympathy 
with the philosophical  approaches of the symposium.  The first of these, by Carina 
Håkinsson,  is based on work over 25 years within the Family Care Foundation, 
founded in 1987.2  It seems that this project was developed to provide an alternative 
to both psychiatric and psychoanalytic approaches to mental illness; it is rather 
clearer from the chapter what its own approach to mental disturbance  is not, than 
how its practice is actually designed, although a kind of fostering in family settings is 
described as one exemplary practice.  The writer describes the necessity to be 
deeply open to the experience of the persons whom the ‘extended therapy room’ is 
intended to help, and for the need for this to be a work of co-operation between 
therapists with one another, and with their clients, in which boundaries and 
distinctions between them remain fluid, unlike in models of practice which assign 
expertise to some and ignorance to others. The writer refers to making sense of her 
years of work in her thesis, and one has the sense that this paper may represent its 
consolidation in a scholarly form. The chapter gives one confidence in the integrity 
and deep commitment of the work which is described. 
 The chapter on narrative work with women, by Leah Salter,   is described as part of 
a doctoral project, but as it appears to have preceded the fieldwork in the thesis it 
might be thought that it is rather early days to be publishing it.  This paper describes 
the value of shared narratives in enabling women who have been victims of abuse to 
find space and time to recover from what has happened to them.  The work of self-
help groups, and of narrative therapies, have made valuable contributions.    
‘Radical Presence:  Alternatives to the Therapeutic State’ by Sheila 
MacNamee  returns to  the Symposium’s theoretical argument. It develops a 
Foucauldian case, drawing also on the writing of Nikolas Rose, against the 
systems of the human sciences or ‘discourses’, and their controlling effects in 
modern life.   This is “because no matter what professional domain we 
                                            
2 The Family Care Foundation is further discussed in the final paper.   
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encounter, we offer ourselves to the surveillance of experts – expert doctors, 
expert scholars, expert therapists, expert politicians, xpert managers.” These 
amount to a regulated “therapeutic state” or “psy-complex.”   The aim of the 
chapter is to “envision alternatives to popularized, dominant, individualizing, 
and frequently pathologizing forms of life….and to explore and imagine 
alternatives to individualized pathology.”  The positive argument is for a 
relational concept of well-being, and for the development of forms of practice 
which can help to bring this about. The ‘psy-complex’ of rationalising 
psychological discourses is assigned the major causal responsibility for 
bringing about these prevailing individualist mentalities.   The author 
acknowledges that his argument might seem rather vague in its implications 
for practice, and offers examples to give it specific definition.  One example is 
the Family Care Foundation, previously discussed, whose ethos and ways of 
working it explains.  A second, in an unlikely re-appropriation of behavioural 
psychologists’ interest in rats, describes a project in which isolated rats were 
freed from addiction to morphine through being returned to their normal social 
relationships with others of their species.  The third describes a community 
survey in New York City of public attitudes to biological approaches to mental 
illness. This found  strong antipathy to diagnosis and medicalisation, and a 
preference which was  based on “talking to people —therapy, counselling, 
group therapy being the most common”, together with social activities and life 
style changes “volunteering, hobbies, music, dance, writing, meditation, 
exercise, yoga, diet, prayer and creating community.” 
A great deal of weight is placed in this article, and in the whole collection, on 
adopting a committed, relational approach to mental suffering, and  the 
papers communicate the spirit of this convincingly, in their different ways. The 
author of the final paper is advocating the development of a ‘radical 
presence’, while being careful not to entirely dismiss the whole formal system 
of mental health care. This idea of creating a ‘presence’ to exist alongside a 
‘psy-complex’ and a ‘therapeutic state’ seems however a modest goal, 
considering how strongly the ‘psy-complex’ and ‘therapeutic state’ is being 
criticised in the symposium. 
Commentary 
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Interesting and broadly consistent with one another in spirit as these papers 
are, they bring to mind some critical questions.  One of these concerns the 
analysis of the ‘therapeutic state’ and ‘psy-complex’ which underpins much of 
the argument of the symposium.  While the idea of the ‘therapeutic state’ 
might seem to assign a great deal of causal responsibility to governments, the 
arguments of the papers do not support that analysis. In the paper on the 
development of American psychiatry, the principal agents in the regressive 
process described are the ‘guild’ or profession of psychiatry – at one time 
dominated in the USA by psychoanalysis – and  the corporate  manufacturers 
and  distributors of drugs. But neither professions nor corporations are mere 
instruments of the state - indeed psychoanalysis has for most of its history 
existed in a space distinct from government, and in many societies has been 
viewed with great suspicion by it.  States are best understood as functioning 
as the mediators and agents of forces, whose social and economic basis lies 
outside themselves. Imagine for example that the NHS in Britain became 
largely privatised (now a far from unlikely prospect), and that health care was 
based, as in the USA, on private medical insurance, albeit of a state-regulated 
kind. Does anyone imagine that the contraction of the role of the state in such 
a system would reduce the power of the medical model, or of the 
pharmaceutical companies, or of the medical profession?   The United States 
experience strongly suggests the exact opposite.  
The symposium takes as its starting point, in its opening chapter, the rejection of 
biological and medicalising models of mental illness, and goes on to recommend   
broadly ‘relational’ and ethically focused alternatives to this.  What is however absent 
is a serious consideration of substantial theorizations of the mind and its functions 
which are not primarily biological or ‘medicalised’, such as those of attachment 
theory and psychoanalysis.3 Although Freud began his work as a neurologist, and 
was always interested in the biological substrata of the mind, essentially 
psychoanalysis, and its part-relative attachment theory, are theories of the mind and 
its functions, not of the body or the brain, and have become increasingly so as they 
                                            
3 One could add the unmentioned cognitive behaviour therapy to this list, since it is ‘mentalistic’ and 
not biological in its basis, and of course has also been argued for forcefully in the Improved Access to 
Psychological Therapies (IAPT) programme, in opposition to medication, whatever view one may take 
of its actual evidence-base and of its antipathy to dynamic psychotherapies.   
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have developed.  Core psychoanalytic concepts such as unconscious mental 
function, anxiety, repression, splitting, transference, counter-transference, and 
containment, have proved  highly serviceable in understanding what can go wrong in 
mental life, both during  infant and child development and during adult life. 
Furthermore they have proved capable of significant development, and of expansion 
in their scope of explanation. The discovery of the possibility of child analysis by 
Melanie Klein and her colleagues is one such instance, the elaboration of attachment 
theory through more conventional experimental methods is another.Indeed one 
rather suspects that many psychotherapists who disavow any particular commitment 
the theories of psychoanalysis, in practice find themselves making everyday use of 
many of its central concepts to make sense of their work with patients. 
The contributors to this symposium in effect repudiate the idea that there is any 
systematic or cumulative body of knowledge of the mind, or of therapeutic 
techniques, for working with its dysfunctions, which can or should guide therapeutic 
work.  Particularity, complexity and an ethical approach, they imply, is all, without 
need for theoretical framings. Implicit is a post-modern repudiation of the idea of 
‘truth’ or ‘objectivity’, a social constructivist emphasis on ‘difference’ being preferred. 
(The significant place of Foucauldian perspectives in the symposium marks out its 
post-modern affinities.) One might say that guiding principles are being looked for in 
the discourses of philsophy and ethics, rather than those of the sciences, of any 
variety.  Perhaps consistent with this, references to psychoanalysis are few, and 
those there are are regrettably slighting and superficial. However  it does not seem 
possible to seriously argue that the psychoanalysts’ and attachment theorists’ 
attention to early development as a cause of later disturbance has been misplaced, 
even though it is far from simple to decide how such developmental issues should be 
engaged with  therapeutically.   
There is better evidence than the first paper allows for the efficacy of the 
interventions derived from these ‘mentalistic’ perspectives. The capacity of 
attachment models to explain and indeed predict patterns of development, including 
across generations, has been amply demonstrated. The literature on the outcomes 
of psychoanalytic psychotherapy with children and adolescents (Kennedy 2004, 
Kennedy and Midgley 2007, Trowell 2012) also indicates, that these methods 
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achieve considerably better outcomes than routine psychiatric treatments.4 The fact 
that these results can be achieved by practitioners from different therapeutic schools 
does not invalidate their theories, since therapists from different schools of 
psychoanalysis share many fundamental assumptions.  Is it to be doubted that those 
who have been more deeply trained in psychotherapetic methods, and have learned 
something substantial about their own ‘internal world’ in the process, are likely to 
achieve better results as therapists than practitioners who bring only good intentions 
to their work?   
There are two dimensions of what one might call ‘structure’ or ‘causality’ which this 
symposium has largely avoided. One of these concerns the explanation of mental 
distress and disturbance in terms of structures of the mind, such as have been 
evolved by psychoanalysis and by attachment theory with its concept of ‘internal 
working models.  The other is the understanding of the social structures which give 
rise to the individualized, pathologising and regulatory mentalities to which the 
contributors are rightly antipathetic.  The implicit argument of the collection is that it 
is the ‘psy-complex’ - that is its ideologies and discourses – which is  determinant, 
and that it is just a matter of human choice to repudiate these discourses and to think 
and act in different ways.  But doesn’t it seem likely that significant causal powers 
also lie elsewhere, in the larger social and economic systems of which the ‘psy-
complex’ is one agent, albeit a significant one.  The anxieties of children in schools, 
students in colleges,  individuals dependent  on long-term medication to keep going, 
the scapegoating  of minorities and migrants, the depression caused by 
unemployment and insecurity,   the pointless and destructive imprisonment of many 
deprived and depressed people, are malfunctions of a social system, not merely 
manifestations of a psy-complex or a ‘therapeutic state.’   One needs to and work for 
alternatives to these structures and systems which create stress and disadvantage.  
It seems in some ways to be a mis-characterisation of our present state to describe it 
as a therapeutic state at all. (One remembers John Major’s call for us to “‘understand 
a little less”.)  Indeed, those committed to a relational view of society (Rustin 2014) 
                                            
4 It is not generally feasible to assess the value of psychotherapies through randomised controlled 
trials, as it has been many physical medicines, because of the many variabilities that are involved. But 
this is not to say that on an exemplary basis this should not be done from time to time, as it has been.  
.   
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might wish for the state to become more and not less therapeutic than it has now 
become.  Where are the resources and commitments to come from to provide the 
more sympathetic, non-stigmatising and non-judgemental care that those suffering 
from psychosocial problems are rightly thought by the contributors to need? Are the 
substantial professions of teachers, nurses, doctors, social workers, and indeed 
psychologists and psychotherapists, who generally have more sympathetic 
approaches to these issues than those in many other occupations, to be simply 
excluded from the idea of  care, because they work for, or are regulated by, the 
‘therapeutic state’?   Are the struggles in which many who work in these fields are 
engaged,  to defend human-responsive forms of care against worsening kinds of 
instrumental and short-termist pressures, to be merely dismissed?  What theory of 
social and political agency do the editors and authors of this symposium have in 
mind, when they call for alternatives to psychiatric models?  Isn’t it necessary for 
those involved in this work to see themselves not as against the state  (thus against 
the role of government as such)  but rather as working, as a radical group of social 
scientists  once put it, ‘both in and against the state’? (London Edinburgh Return 
Group 1980). That is, to defend, in the agencies of government as well as in other 
settings, approaches which are respectful of people and their needs, and which do 
not adopt irrelevant and often harmful kinds of medicalised remedies for 
psychosocial conditions. 
Psychotherapies of the counter-culture, and a ‘radical presence’, are not, by 
themselves, enough, to respond to the situation which this symposium identifies, 
which is often one of great pain and  distress, however the ‘psy-complex’ may 
choose to label it.  
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